Warfare in the Middle East since 1945 by Ahron Bregman

Author:Ahron Bregman [Bregman, Ahron]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781351873642
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 2017-05-15T00:00:00+00:00

Notes

F. Gregory Gause, III is an associate professor of political science at the University of Vermont. The author would like to thank the following for comments on earlier versions of the article: Raad Alkadiri, Amatzia Baram. Mark Gasiorowski, Lori Gronich, Fred Lawson, Phebe Marr, Martin Malin. Andrew’ Parasiliti, David Pervin, David Priess, Albadr Abu-Bakr Al-Shateri, and David Walder.

1. Al-Hayat, July 18, 1997, pp. 1, 6.

2. Al-Hayat, July 18, 1997, pp. 1,6.

3. The logic suggested here is similar to the logic suggested in two important recent theoretical treatments of the causes of war. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), Chapter 4; Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000). The difference is that Van Evera and Copeland see decline exclusively in terms of power relations between states, where my focus is on domestic “decline.”

4. I am not the first to suggest this explanation. On the Gulf War, see Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990–91: A Failed or Impossible Task?” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1992); Shibley Telhami, “Between Theory and Fact: Explaining American Behavior in the Gulf War,” Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1992); Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, “Why Saddam Hussein Invaded Kuwait” Survival, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1991). On the Iran-Iraq War, see Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), Chapter 2; W. Thom Workman, The Social Origins of the Iran-Iraq War, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, (New York: Free Press, 1991).

5. Jack Levy, “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique,” in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.), Handbook of War Studies, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

6. Steven David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1991); Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Edward Azar and Chung-In Moon (eds.), National Security in the Third World, (Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1988); Brian L. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992).

7. “Offensive,” or “aggressive,” realism posits that the anarchical nature of the international system pushes states to expand their power when the possibility of doing so presents itself. It is distinguished from defensive realism, which posits that states seek security, not power per se. For the best bibliographical source on this distinction, see Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (1998), p. 146.

8. For offensive realist explanations for the 1990 decision, see Richard Hermann, “Coercive Diplomacy and the Crisis over Kuwait, 1990–91,” in Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (eds.), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1994), p. 235; Amatzia Baram, “The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-Making in Baghdad,” in Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin (eds.), Iraq’s Road to War, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), pp. 16–26. On the centrality of the Glaspie meeting, see Mohamed Heikal, Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War, (London: Harper Collins, 1993), pp.

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